Catalan nationalism
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Catalan nationalism, or Catalanism, is a political movement that advocates the political autonomy of Catalonia or the Catalan Countries and in some cases, independence from Spain and France. It was born in the 19th century, with the aim of restoring some kind of self-government to Catalonia, and obtaining recognition for the Catalan language. These demands were summarized in the so-called Bases de Manresa in 1892.
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[edit] The Origins of Catalan national identity
During the first centuries of the Reconquista, the Franks drove the Muslims south of the Pyrenees. To prevent future incursions, Holy Roman Emperor Charlemagne created the Hispanic March in 790 CE, which consisted of buffer states sandwiched between the Frankish kingdom and Al-Andalus. One of these territories was the embryo of Catalonia. Between 878 and 988 CE, the Catalan buffer state became a hotbed of Frankish-Muslim conflict. However, as the Frankish monarchy and the Caliphate of Córdoba weakened during the 11th century, conquest and resettlement came to a virtual stop in Catalonia. This pause allowed for a process of consolidation throughout the region’s many earldoms, resulting in their combination into the County of Barcelona. By 1070, Ramon Berenguer I, Count of Barcelona, had subordinated other Catalan Counts and intransigent nobles as vassals. His action brought peace to a turbulent feudal system. Moreover, it sowed the seeds of Catalan identity.
According to several scholars, the term “Catalan” and “Catalonia” emerged near the end of the 11th century and appeared in the Usatges of 1150. Two factors fostered this identity: stable institutions and cultural prosperity. While the temporary lack of foreign invasions contributed to Catalonia’s stability, it was not a main cause. Rather, it provided a site for sociopolitical development. For example, after Catalonia merged with the Crown of Aragón in 1137 through a dynastic marriage, the Catalans managed to check the king’s power. Around 1150, the king approved a series of pacts, called the Usatges, which “explicitly acknowledged legal equality between burghers…and nobility” (Woolard 17). In addition, the Catalan-Aragonese gentry established the Corts, a representative body, comprised of nobles, bishops and abbots that counterbalanced the King’s authority. By the end of the 13th century, “the monarch needed the consent of the Corts to approve laws or collect revenue” (McRoberts 10). Soon after, the Corts elected a standing body called the Diputació del General or the Generalitat.
The Catalan Corts were not democratic, however. Even though they curtailed the monarch’s power, but were not egalitarian or fully representative because the clergy, aristocracy and burghers constituted a small portion of Catalan society. But this does not diminish the Corts’ importance, given that they buttressed a vast trade network. Following an accord with the French in the 13th century, King Jaume I conquered Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Subsequent conquests expanded into the Mediterranean, reaching Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, Naples and Greece, so by 1350 Catalonia-Aragón “presided over the one of the most extensive and powerful mercantile empires of the Mediterranean during this period” (Woolard 16). Catalonia’s economic success formed a powerful merchant class, which wielded the Corts as its political weapon. It also produced a smaller middle class, or menestralia, that was “composed of artisans, shopkeepers and workshop owners” (McRoberts 11). Over the 13th and 14th centuries, these merchants accrued so much wealth and political sway that placed a significant check on the Aragonese crown. Whereas the Castilian sovereign exercised near absolute power, by the 15th century the Aragonese monarch “was not considered legitimate until he had sworn to respect the basic law of the land in the presence of the Corts” (Balcells 9). This balance of power is a classic example of pactisme, or contractualism, which is a defining feature of Catalan political culture.
Along with political and economic success, Catalan culture flourished in the 13th and 14th centuries. During this period, the Catalan vernacular gradually replaced Latin as the language of culture and government. Scholars rewrote everything from ancient Visigoth law to religious sermons in Catalan (Woolard 14). Wealthy citizens bolstered Catalan’s literary appeal through poetry contests and history pageants dubbed the Jocs Florals, or “Floral Games.” For the illiterate majority, these performances created an avenue of access to Barcelona high culture. As the empire expanded southeast into Valencia and the Mediterranean, Catalan followed. Linguistic unity not only fostered political cohesion, but it also had lasting impacts. For example, the Catalans authored the Book of the Maritime Consulate, an innovation in maritime trade. A second example is Tirant lo Blanc, a famous work of chivalry written in Valencia. This period of literary proliferation fused culture and Catalan identity together, which had long-term effects.
The medieval heyday of Catalan culture would not last, however. After a bout of famine and plague hit Catalonia in the mid-14th century, the population dropped from 50,000 to 20,000 (McRoberts 13). This exacerbated feudal tensions, sparking serf revolts in rural areas and political impasses in Barcelona. Financial issues and the burden of empire further strained the region. Worse yet, in 1410, the Aragonese king died without leaving an heir to throne. Finding no alternative, Catalan-Aragonese leaders appointed Ferdinand I, a Castilian. But this solved little. The new monarch and his descendants began to impinge on the “privileges” of Catalan nobles, infuriating the Generalitat. From 1458 to 1479, civil wars between King John II and regional oligarchs engulfed Catalonia. During the conflict, John II “had married his heir, Ferdinand [this being the famous Ferdinand II of Aragón], to Isabella of Castile, the heiress to the throne, in a bid to find outside allies” (Balcells 11). Meanwhile, Castile’s power eclipsed Catalonia’s, which facilitated its integration into and subjugation after John II’s victory. This dynastic union deprived the Catalans of foreign policy control and trade rights while the Spanish Inquisition of 1487 reduced religious freedoms (McRoberts 14). These political and economic restrictions impacted all segments of society, from Barcelona’s wealthy merchants to its Jewish community. Also, because of the dynastic conflicts, Catalonia squandered in one century most of what it had gained in political rights and cultural freedoms between 1070 and 1410.
Nevertheless, early political, economic and cultural advances gave Catalonia “a mode of organization and an awareness of its own identity which might in some ways be described as national, though the idea of popular or national sovereignty did not yet exist” (Balcells 9). Other scholars like Kenneth McRoberts and Katheryn Woolard hold similar views. Both support Pierre Vilar, who contends that in 13th and 14th centuries “the Catalan principality was perhaps the European country to which it would be the least inexact or risky to use such seemingly anachronistic terms as political and economic imperialism or ‘nation-state’” (McRoberts 13). In other words, an array of political and cultural forces laid the foundations of Catalan “national” identity. Llobera corroborates this opinion, saying, “By the mid-thirteenth century, the first solid manifestations of national consciousness can be observed.” Indeed, 13th and 14th century Catalonia did exhibit features of a nation-state. The role of Catalan Counts, the Corts, Mediterranean imperialism, economic prosperity and linguistic unification support this thesis. But as Vilar points out, these analogies are only true if we acknowledge that a 14th century nation-state is anachronistic. In other words, those living in Catalonia before nationalism took root possessed something like a collective identity.
[edit] The Development of modern Catalanism
Despite Catalonia’s subjugation in 1716, it quickly developed into the wealthiest region of Spain. The 18th century Spanish economy depended entirely on agriculture based on farming techniques dating back to Roman times. Their social structure stayed hierarchical, if not feudal, while the Catholic Church and Bourbon monarchs wrestled for supremacy. Into the 19th century, Spain remained politically and culturally isolated from the rest of Europe. As England, Germany and France tinkered with coal-fed factories, steam engines and new philosophies, Madrid found itself increasingly at odds with the Church, its colonies and the ghosts of past glories. In the meantime, Catalonia regained access to overseas markets and erected a steam-powered mill in 1832, launching Barcelona’s industrial age (Conversi 11). Sustained by a pro-industry middle class, the region mechanized everything from textiles and crafts to wineries. As discussed in the previous section, industrialization and the nationalist Renaixença movement went hand in hand. Annoyed with Madrid’s shortcomings, Barcelona’s intelligentsia began to fashion an alternative, Catalan identity.
To finance their cultural nationalist project, many of these intellectuals sought patronage and protection from Barcelona’s industrial barons. This relationship played a decisive role in the development of Catalanism. On the one hand, intellectuals sought to revive Catalan identity as a response to Spain’s backwardness. They wanted to distance themselves from the country’s problems by creating a new ontology rooted in Catalan culture, language and worldview. On the other hand, those same intellectuals avoided demands for separation. They knew that their patrons would want Catalan nationalism to include Spain for two reasons. First, secession from Spain would devastate industrial markets and impoverish the region. Secondly, the Catalan industrial class was “unconditionally pro-Spanish at heart” (Conversi 18). As Woolard notes, the economic interests of Madrid and the budding Catalan industrialists converged during the 18th century, resulting in cooperation between both despite Catalonia’s loss of autonomy (19). For the nationalist literati, this meant that Catalanism could propagate a national identity, but it had to function within Spain.
Furthermore, Barcelona’s industrial elite wanted Catalonia to stay part of Spain. As vexing as the Spanish government may have been, Catalonia’s industrial markets relied on consumption from other regions. In fact, part of the industrialists’ desire to remain part of Spain was their desire for protectionism, hegemony in domestic markets and the push to “influence Madrid’s political choices by intervening in central Spanish affairs” (Conversi 18-20). Though only 2.7 percent of the Spanish Congress represented Catalonia, it made no economic sense to secede from Spain. To the contrary, Catalonia’s prominent industrialists considered themselves the country’s economic heads. As Stanley Payne observes: "The modern Catalan élite had played a major role in…what there was of economic industrialization in the nineteenth century, and had tended to view Catalonia not as the antagonist but to some degree the leader of a freer, more prosperous Spain" (482). Barcelona’s bourgeois industrialists even claimed that protectionism and leadership served the interests of the “‘national market’ or of ‘developing the national economy’ (national in this case meaning Spanish) ” (Balcells 19). The inclusion of Spain was instrumental to Catalonia’s success, meaning that industrialists would not tolerate any secessionist movement. Complete independence assured nothing but weak markets, an enemy with a common border and persistent anarchist movements. And hence, though manufacturers funded the Renaixença—and Catalan nationalism—it demanded that Catalonia stay part of Spain to ensure economic stability.
Because of the industrialists’ effect on Catalanism, intellectuals like Almirall and Pi i Margall abandoned their hopes for an independent Catalonia. Instead, these men clothed their patrons’ demands for protectionism in particularist rhetoric. Almirall marshaled the support of Catalan industrial executives, artists, culturalists, fellow nationalists and anti-monarchists by emphasizing the “lack of political power for industrialists, the absence of protective measures for the Spanish economy and the threats to abolish the Catalan civil code” (Conversi 18). But he could only go so far because many of these wealthy patrons were Spanish loyalists. Consequently, practical concerns outweighed the exclusionary nationalism expressed in Almirall’s Lo Catalanisme and Pi i Margalls Las Nacionalidades. Their hyperbolic claims of a Catalan “character” and Volksgeist had to remain on paper if they wanted to keep their funding. So instead of calls for separatism, industrialists and nationalist intellectuals promoted federalism. This would provide Catalan factory owners access to Spanish markets and allow them to keep their Spanish identity. At the same time, it safeguarded Catalanist interests within the Spanish state by restoring autonomy to the region.
This scheme did not work at first, nor did it succeed until the late 1880s. Finally, in 1889, the pro-industrialist Lliga de Catalunya managed to save the Catalan Civil Code after an attempt to homogenize the national legal structures (Conversi 20). Two years later, they coaxed Madrid into passing protectionist measures, which reinvigorated pro-Spanish attitudes among manufacturers. Meanwhile, Catalan nationalists enjoyed patronage, a burgeoning cultural milieu in Barcelona and the security of Catalan identity within Spain. This nationalist-industrialist accord is a classic example of inclusionary Catalanism. Nationalists may have hoped for an independent Catalonia but their patrons needed access to markets and protectionism. As a result, nationalists could propagate the Catalan identity provided that it coincided with the industrialists’ pro-Spanish stance. Because the Lliga de Catalunya endorsed this compromise, it dominated Catalan politics after the turn of the century. Payne notes: "The main Catalanist party, the bourgeois Lliga, never sought separatism but rather a more discrete and distinctive place for a self-governing Catalonia within a more reformist and progressive Spain. The Lliga’s leaders ran their 1916 electoral campaign under the slogan ‘Per l’Espanya Gran’ (For a Great Spain)" (482). The Lliga had tempered the nationalist position to one of inclusionary nationalism. It allowed Catalanism to flourish, but demanded that it promote federalism within Spain, and not separation from it. Any deviation from this delicate balance would have enraged those pro-Catalan and Spanish-identifying industrialists. Ultimately, this prevented any moves towards separation while strengthening Catalonia’s “federal” rights after the Mancomunitat took power in 1914.
[edit] Catalanism in the 20th Century
During the first part of the 20th century, the main nationalist party was the right-wing Lliga Regionalista, headed by Francesc Cambó. The main achievement in this period was the Mancomunitat de Catalunya a grouping of the four catalan provinces, with limited administrative power. This institution was abolished during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera.
In 1931, the left-wing Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya party won the elections in Catalonia, advocating a Catalan republic federated with Spain. Under pressure from the Spanish government, the leader of ERC, Francesc Macià i Llussà, accepted an autonomous Catalan government instead , which was called Generalitat de Catalunya. Again, this was abolished in 1939, after the Spanish Civil War.
Several political or cultural Catalan movements operated underground during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, which lasted until 1975. A president of the Catalan government was still designed and operated symbolically in exile; but because of the agreements between Franco's government and Nazi Germany, president Lluís Companys was captured after the Fall of France in 1940, sentenced to death and executed by Franco's regime.
His successor in exile, Josep Tarradellas, kept away from Spain until Franco's death in 1975. When he came back in 1977 the government of Catalonia -the Generalitat- was restored again. Following the approval of the Spanish constitution in 1978, Catalonia was organized as an autonomous community inside Spain in 1979, and in 1980 Jordi Pujol was elected president. Local governments in the neighbouring Valencian-Catalan speaking areas of Valencia (Generalitat Valenciana) and the Balearic Islands (Govern de les Illes Balears) were also elected. In contrast, there is no significant political autonomy, nor recognition of the language in the historical Catalan territories belonging to France (Roussillon, in French département of Pyrénées-Orientales).
Currently, the main political parties which define themselves as being Catalan nationalists are Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. A significant part of the population in Catalonia would support a larger degree of autonomy, and some of them would prefer an independent state. Although it must also be noted that in the last referendum on a new statute that gave Catalonia more powers than before only 48.84% of the total electorate voted.
[edit] References
- Balcells, Albert. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996.
- Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company, 1997.
- Guibernau, Monserrat. Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, transition and democracy. Routledge: New York, 2004.
- Harvgreaves, John. Freedom for Catalonia? Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games. New York: Cambridge, 2000.
- Linz, Juan. "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State: the Case of Spain." Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region. Eds. S.N. Eisenstadt, and Stein Rokkan. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973. 32-116.
- Llobera, Josep R. Foundations of National Identity: from Catalonia to Europe. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.
- McRoberts, Kenneth. Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State. New York: Oxford, 2001.
- Payne, Stanley G. "Nationalism, Regionalism and Micronationalism in Spain." Journal of Contemporary History 26.3/4 (1991): 479-491.
- Smith, Angel, and Clare Mar-Molinero. "The Myths and Realities of Nation-Building in the Iberian Peninsula." Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Eds. Angel Smith, and Clare Mar-Molinero. Washington DC: Berg, 1996. 1-33.
- Vilar, Pierre. La Catalogne dans L’Espagne moderne. Paris: Flammation, 1977
- Woolard, Kathryn A. Double Talk: Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
- Catalanism in Catalan Encyclopaedia
