Quintinshill rail crash
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The Quintinshill rail crash occurred on 22 May 1915, at Quintinshill, an intermediate block station on a double line with refuge loops on the Caledonian Railway near Gretna Green in Scotland. Involving five separate trains, the crash killed 227 people and is by far the worst rail crash in the UK. The accident is not well known because the majority of victims were soldiers and the it occurred during World War I, when all news was subject to official censorship. A trial afterwards convicted two negligent railway workers of having caused the accident.
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[edit] Causes
A distracted signalman forgot about a stationary local train waiting at his signals, and this led to a multiple collision between a troop train, the local train, two coal trains in adjacent sidings and, shortly afterwards, an express train, which ploughed into the wreckage. 227 people died and 246 were injured - of the 500 soldiers of the 7th Royal Scots on the troop train, only 60 made it to roll-call the next morning. The precise number of fatalities is not known because the roll of the regiment was destroyed in the fire. The disaster was made much worse by fire caused by wooden carriages and gas lighting.
The accident took place at a change of shift. George Meakin had worked the night shift and was relieved by James Tinsley. These two men had an agreement whereby if the local train was stopping at Quintinshill, Tinsley would travel on it and start work half an hour late. Meakin would record all the details of that half hour on a piece of paper and then Tinsley would copy this into the train register when he arrived, to cover up his late arrival. This arrangement and chatter about war news distracted Tinsley so that he forgot about the local train on which he had himself arrived. Both signalmen had fallen into sloppy practices and neglected at least three standard safety procedures required by the rules.
The accident was exacerbated because one of the trains involved was a troop train. Because of the heavy wartime traffic, shortage of carriages meant that the railway company had to press into service obsolete Great Central Railway stock. These carriages had wooden bodies and frames, so had very little crash resistance compared with steel framed stock, and were gas-lit. The gas (oil-gas) was stored in reservoirs slung under the underframe. These reservoirs had just been charged. This plus the lack of available water, kept the resulting fire burning for two days. It was reported at the time that not one lump of coal from the northbound coal train or the locomotives was found after the fire was extinguished, but this may be more down to exaggerated reporting than fact. The southbound coal train was returning empty waggons to South Wales: it was a Jellicoe Special serving the Royal Navy. The fire probably killed more people than the actual accident did.
The two signalmen, James Tinsley and George Meakin, were sentenced to three years and eighteen months in prison respectively for culpable homicide due to gross neglect of duties.
[edit] Lessons learned
The Quintinshill disaster would have been avoided if the line had been equipped with track circuits, which detect the presence of trains and can prevent the signals being changed to "clear". However, as Quintinshill had good visibility from the signal box, this station would have had low priority for the fitting of track circuits.
The Quintinshill signal box was also supplied with "lever collars", devices that should have been slipped over the signal levers to remind the signalmen not to move them until the obstruction had been cleared, but, despite written instructions, the signalmen had got out of the habit of using them. These lever collars are not automatic like track circuits, and hence are less foolproof, but remain in common use to this day.
The Board of Trade accident report is available as a pdf file. The conclusion was that if the signalmen had followed basic operating rules and used the safety devices provided, the accident would not have happened, and no recommendations for additional equipment or rule changes were necessary.
[edit] The trial
Meakin and Tinsley were the only signalmen in the UK to be actually given prison sentences for causing an accident. Others have been convicted of manslaughter but were discharged (e.g. Thirsk). However the level of culpability at Quintinshill was much higher, as the Lord Justice General's lucid summing up showed:
"...They gave the signal that the line was clear and the troop train might safely come on. At that moment there was before their very eyes a local train obstructing that line. One man in the signal box had actually left that train a few minutes before when it was being shunted. The other had a few minutes before directed the local train to go on to the up main line. If you can explain that staggering fact consistently with the two men having faithfully and honestly discharged their duties you should acquit them. If you cannot ... you must convict them."
The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict in just eight minutes. Thomas (1969) lists eight separate ways in which the signalmen broke operating rules, mostly regularly, not just that morning.
It is interesting to note that as the incident occurred in Scotland and many of the fatalities occurred at the Carlisle main hospital just over the border in England, differences in Scottish and English law rendered the guilty pair indictable in both jurisdictions for manslaughter. Under Scottish law, it is the act that results in loss of life (regardless of where the actual death occurs) that has to occur on Scottish soil. However, under English law, it is the loss of life (regardless of where the fatal act occurs) that has to occur on English soil.
[edit] Similar accidents
The Hawes Junction rail crash of 1910 also involved a busy signalman forgetting about a train on the main line, but because the signalman there was fully focused on his job, his momentary lapse was more excusable. Likewise, at the Winwick rail crash, an overworked signalman forgot about a train in his section, and was misled by a junior. In neither case were track circuits installed.
[edit] Chain of Responsibility
"Chain of Responsibility" is a system where safety is held to be the responsibility of an organisation as a whole and not just of those at the front line.
In the case of the Quintinshill accident, it raises the question "Why did the signalmen not ask for permission to vary the shift changeover times, and avoid the dangerous distraction of rewriting the train register?" If this had been allowed, the risk of an accident could have been reduced.
One can only suppose that management of the railway concerned would have considered such a request uppity if not a sackable offence. Their reasons for wanting to vary the changeover would have been seen as insufficient to justify exemption from the universal shift pattern.
[edit] See also
- List of rail accidents
- List of rail accidents in the United Kingdom
- List of British rail accidents by death toll
- List of United Kingdom disasters by death toll
- Fatal Accident Inquiry
[edit] References
- Thomas, John (1969). Gretna: Britain's Worst Railway Disaster (1915). Newton Abbot, UK: David and Charles. ISBN 715346458.
- Hamilton., J.A.B. (1967). British Railway Accidents of the 20th Century (reprinted as Disaster down the Line).. George Allen and Unwin / Javelin Books. ISBN 0-7137-1973-7.
- Nock, O.S. (1980). Historic Railway Disasters, 2nd ed., Ian Allan.
- Rolt, L.T.C. (1956 (and later editions)). Red for Danger. Bodley Head / David and Charles / Pan Books.
