Royal Ulster Constabulary
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The Royal Ulster Constabulary GC (RUC) was the police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 to 2001. It was founded on 1 June 1922 out of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). At its peak the force had around 8500 officers with a further 4500 reservists, officially members of the RUC Reserve, but in practice members of the RUC (unlike the earlier Ulster Special Constabulary, which was a force in its own right, with its own rank structure). It was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2001.
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[edit] Early history
The RUC officially came into existence on 1 June 1922. The force's new headquarters were established at the Atlantic Buildings in Belfast, and Charles Wickham was the first Inspector-General. The force was largely identical to the RIC - with the twin duties of law enforcement and maintenance of the political status quo. Like the RIC, and in contrast to Great Britain and the rest of Ireland, all members of the new force were armed and wore a dark green uniform as opposed to the dark blue worn by the British police and the Garda Síochána.
The new RUC was immediately involved in dealing with the sectarian rioting and assassinations in Belfast and Derry. A District Inspector Nixon [citation needed], formerly of the RIC, is infamous in Belfast Catholic folk memory for having allegedly organised and taken part in sectarian murders of Catholics (especially those of the McMahon family) in the city during Northern Ireland's turbulent birth. He was never indicted, however, and filed a libel suit on one occasion. He later became an independent unionist MP.
However, as the 1920s progressed violence soon fell sharply away and was only briefly revived by the economic downturn of the 1930s, although the IRA kept its hand in with sporadic bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. During World War II, the main concern of the RUC was smuggling from across the border and the enforcement of wartime regulations. In April 1943 women were allowed to join the force for the first time.
Post-war policies brought about the gradual improvement in the lot of the RUC, interrupted only by a return to hostilities by the IRA. The IRA's 'border campaign' of 1957-1962 killed seven RUC officers. The force was streamlined in the 1960s, a new headquarters was opened at Knock in Belfast and a number of rural barracks were closed. In 1967, the forty-two hour working week was introduced.
[edit] Policing in a divided society
From 1970 onwards.
Policing Northern Ireland's divided society proved difficult, as each community (nationalist and unionist) had different attitudes towards the institutions of the state (Weitzer 1985, 1995). To unionists, the state had full legitimacy, as did its institutions, its parliament, the Crown and its police force. Many nationalists, however, viewed the government of Northern Ireland as sectarian, anti-Catholic, anti-nationalist, and as a gerrymander that had partitioned Ireland against the will of its people to create a pro-union electoral majority in the northeast.
This mindset was expressed by David Trimble in the following terms: "Ulster Unionists, fearful of being isolated on the island, built a solid house, but it was a cold house for catholics. And northern nationalists, although they had a roof over their heads, seemed to us as if they meant to burn the house down" [1].
As policing is by definition the upholding of the law and order of the existing institutional structures, it is not surprising then that the RUC became closely identified with the state, through its largely Protestant and unionist membership, its use of the word 'Royal' in the title and its use of flags and emblems of the northern state and the United Kingdom of which Northern Ireland is a part.
Throughout its existence, republican political leaders urged members of the nationalist community not to join the RUC. Social Democratic and Labour Party Member of Parliament (MP) and critic of the force Seamus Mallon, who later served as Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, claimed the RUC was "97% Protestant and 100% unionist."
The RUC did attract Roman Catholic members. These men were for the most part former members of the RIC, who came north from the Irish Republic after the partition of the island. The bitterness of the fighting in the Anglo-Irish War precluded them from remaining in territory now controlled by their former enemies. The percentage of Catholics in the RUC dropped as these men retired over time [citation needed].
However, IRA attacks on Catholics who joined the RUC, and the perception that the police force was "a Protestant force for a Protestant people" meant that Catholic participation in the Royal Ulster Constabulary always remained disproproportionally small in terms of the Catholic percentage of the overall Northern Irish population. Notable exceptions include RUC Chief Constable Sir James Flanagan KBE, a catholic from Derry, Deputy Chief Constable Michael McAtamney, Assistant Chief Constable Cathal Ramsey and Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan [2].
In December 1997, London's The Independent newspaper published a leaked internal RUC document which reported that a third of all Catholic RUC officers had suffered religious discrimination and/or harassment from Protestant fellow officers [3].
[edit] The Troubles
The rise of civil rights protests at the end of the decade marked the beginning of The Troubles. The RUC continued its traditional pro-unionist role when it found itself confronting marchers protesting at the gerrymandering of local governmental electoral wards and the discrimination in local housing allocation. Many of these Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association protests were banned by the government of Northern Ireland, but often the marches went ahead regardless. The events at Duke Street in Derry and Burntollet Bridge, in east County Londonderry, were particularly notable for the brutality used.
The B Specials, proved highly controversial, with the latter unit seen by some nationalists as much more anti-Catholic and anti-nationalist than the RUC, which unlike the B Specials attracted some Catholic recruits. The severe pressure on the RUC and B-Specials led in August 1969 to the British Army being called in to support the civil administration under Operation Banner. Initially the army was welcomed by Catholic nationalists in preference to the RUC and in particular the B Specials (who were stood down on 30 April 1970). However heavy handed army behaviour, most notably on Bloody Sunday (when thirteen people were shot dead in the aftermath of a civil rights march), soon saw the minority Catholic population turn against the Army.
The high level of civil disturbance led to an exhaustive inquiry into the disturbances in Northern Ireland carried out by the distinguished English judge Lord Scarman, the then Home Secretary, James Callaghan, called on Lord Hunt to assess and advise on the policing situation. He was assisted in this task by Sir Robert Mark, who later became Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and Sir James Robertson, the then Chief Constable of Glasgow.
Th report was published on 3 October 1969 and most of the recommendations susequently accepted and implemented. The aim being a complete reorganization of the RUC, with the aim of both modernizing the force and bringing it into line with the other police forces in the UK. This meant the introduction of the British rank and promotion structure, the creation of 12 Police Divisions and 39 Sub-Divisions, the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary [4], and the creation of a Police Authority representative of the whole community.
Callaghan asked Sir Arthur Young, Commissioner of the City of London Police, to be seconded for a year. Young's appointment began the long process of turning the RUC into a British police service. The RUC Reserve was formed as an auxiliary police force, and all military-style duties were handed over to the newly formed Ulster Defence Regiment, which was under military command. All military-style duties were handed over to the new Ulster Defence Regiment, which replaced the B Specials, and which in turn would eventually be replaced, amidst allegations that it too was sectarian, by the Royal Irish Regiment.
Callaghan picked Young, a career policeman, because no other British policeman could match his direct experience of policing acutely unstable societies and of reforming gendarmeries. From 1943 to 1945, he was Director of Public Safety and Director of Security in the military government of Allied-occupied Italy. Later, he had been seconded to the Federation of Malaya at the height of the 'Emergency' (1952-1953) and to the crown colony of Kenya during Mau Mau (1954) [5].
The first deaths of the Troubles occurred in July 1969. 67-year old Francis McCloskey, a Catholic civilian, died on 14 July[6], a day after being beaten around the head with batons by RUC officers in Dungiven. The police had baton-charged a crowd leaving a dance hall after disturbances relating to an Orange Order parade in the town the day before. Samuel Devenny, another civilian, died on 17 July, as a result of a beating he had sustained in his home from the RUC in Derry in April. His teenage daughters were also beaten during the incident. In August 1969, the RUC killed the third and the first child victim of the troubles, in Belfast. Nine-year old Patrick Rooney was shot as he lay in bed by policemen firing from a moving truck
On 11 October 1969, Constable Victor Arbuckle was shot by loyalists on Belfast's Shankill Road during serious rioting in protest at the recommendations of the Hunt Report. He became the first police fatality of The Troubles. In August 1970, two young constables, Donaldson and Millar, died when an abandoned car they were examining near Crossmaglen exploded. They became the first victims of the re-organized Provisional IRA campaign.
In March 1972, the Government of Northern Ireland resigned and the parliament was prorogued. Northern Ireland subsequently came under direct rule from Westminster with its own Secretary of State, who had overall responsibility for security policy.
Starting in late 1982, a number of IRA and INLA men who were enroute to commit terrorist acts were shot dead by the RUC, usually at checkpoints. The constant and prolonged nature of these incidents led to accusations of a shoot-to-kill policy by the RUC. The British government set up the Stalker Inquiry to investigate. In September 1983, four officers were charged with murder as a result of the inquiry, although all were subsequently found not guilty.
In May 1986 John Hermon, then Chief Constable, publicly accused Unionist politicians of "consorting with paramilitary elements." Anger at the Anglo-Irish Agreement led to unionists attacking over 500 homes, of Catholics and RUC officers. 150 RUC families were forced to move as a result of the intimidation.
In February 1994, Amnesty International published a report which stated there was "mounting evidence" of collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries [citation needed].
In 1998 Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan said in a television interview that he was unhappy with any RUC officers belonging to the Orange Order or any of the other loyal orders. While the RUC refused to give any details on how many officers were members of the Order, 39 RUC officers are listed on the Order's Roll of Honour (of Orangemen killed in the conflict). If this is was a representative cross-section, it would mean 13% of the force were members of the Orange Order. Many officers were suspended for taking part in protests of banned or rerouted marches.
The size of the RUC increased on several occasions. At its height, there were 8,500 regular police officers supported by about 5,000 full-time and part-time reserve officers, making it the second largest force in the United Kingdom after the Metropolitan Police in London. The direction and control of the RUC was in the hands in the Chief Constable, who was assisted by two Deputy Chief Constables and nine Assistant Chief Constables. For operational purposes, Northern Ireland was divided into twelve Divisions and 39 Sub-Divisions. RUC ranks, duties, conditions of service and pay were generally in line with those of police forces in Great Britain.
[edit] Awards
Awards for gallantry for individual officers since 1969 included 16 George Medals, 103 Queen's Gallantry Medals, 111 Queen's Commendations for Bravery and 69 Queen's Police Medals.
Two years before its reorganisation, the RUC was awarded the George Cross for bravery in dealing with terrorist threat, a rarely awarded honour which had only been awarded collectively once before, to the island of Malta.
[edit] Casualties
Officially, 303 officers were killed and over 9000 were injured during the Troubles (mid-1960s to late 1990s), of whom 277 were killed in attacks by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA).
However, according to the CAIN project at the University of Ulster [7], 301 active RUC officers were killed and 18 "ex-RUC officers", which would total 319 fatalities.
[edit] Patten Report
The Belfast Agreement produced a wholescale reorganisation of inter-community, governmental and policing systems, including a power-sharing executive with David Trimble and the nationalist SDLP's Seamus Mallon (later replaced by new party leader Mark Durkan) as co-chairmen. The perceived bias, and the clear under-representation of Catholics and nationalists, in the RUC meant that as part of the Good Friday Agreement (1998) there was a fundamental policing review.
The review was headed by Chris Patten, a former Hong Kong Governor and British Conservative Minister under Margaret Thatcher, and published in September 1999. It recommended a wholesale reorganisation of policing, with the Royal Ulster Constabulary being renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and a greater drive to recruit Catholic recruits and should adopt a new crest and cap badge.
The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was introduced in November 2001 (full title: The Police Service of Northern Ireland (incorporating the Royal Ulster Constabulary GC). As part of the change, the police service dropped the word 'Royal' from everyday usage and adopted a new badge that included the crown, harp, and shamrock - the symbols used by the RUC and RIC - each with an identification with one or other community.
[edit] The Stevens Inquiry & loyalist collusion
On 18 April 2003 as part of the third report into collusion between Loyalist paramilitaries, RUC, and British Army, Sir John Stevens published an Overview and Recommendations document (Stevens 3).[1] Stevens intention was to make recommendations which arose from serious shortcomings he had sofar identified in all three Enquiries.[2]
The third Stevens Inquiry began in 1999, and referred to his previous reports when making his recommendations. Stevens began his report by saying:
"My Enquiries have highlighted collusion, the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, and the extreme of agents being involved in murder. These serious acts and omissions have meant that people have been killed or seriously injured."[3]
Stevens third inquiry focused in detail on only two of the murders in which collusion is alleged; the murder of Brian Adam Lambert in 1987 & the murder of Pat Finucane in 1989. Stevens 3 also included investigation into a small number of related agent case histories, agents known as Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS). This included looking into allegations made by members of the Force Research Unit (FRU), and some of the activities of Ulster Defence Association (UDA) assets William Alfred Stobie and Brian Nelson.
Stevens used the following criteria as a definition of collusion while conducting his investigation:
- The failure to keep records or the existence of contradictory accounts which could limit the opportunity to rebut serious allegations.
- The absence of accountability which could allow acts or omissions by individuals to go undetected.
- The withholding of information which could impede the prevention of crime and the arrest of suspects.
- The unlawful involvement of agents in murder which could imply that the security forces sanction killings.[4]
Stephens also pointed out that his investigation had been obstructed:
"Throughout my three Enquiries I recognised that I was being obstructed. This obstruction was cultural in its nature and widespread within parts of the Army and the RUC. I am confident that through the investigative efforts of my Enquiry team, I have managed to overcome it and achieve the overall objectives of my Enquiry."[5]
Stevens, in the Conclusion's section of the document stated:
"I have uncovered enough evidence to lead me to believe that the murders of Patrick Finucane and Brian Adam Lambert could have been prevented. I also believe that the RUC investigation of Patrick Finucane’s murder should have resulted in the early arrest and detection of his killers.
I conclude there was collusion in both murders [Brian Adam Lambert's & Finucane's] and the circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder.
My three Enquiries have found all these elements of collusion [above] to be present. The co-ordination, dissemination and sharing of intelligence were poor. Informants and agents were allowed to operate without effective control and to participate in terrorist crimes. Nationalists were known to be targeted but were not properly warned or protected. Crucial information was withheld from Senior Investigating Officers. Important evidence was neither exploited nor preserved."[6]
Noted in the report was that as a result of the Stevens 3 inquiries and up to the date of publication there had been 144 arrests with 94 peoeple convicted, along with 57 separate reports submitted to the Northern Ireland Director of Public Prosecutions.
[edit] Reaction to Stevens 3
The SDLP leader Mark Durkan responded to the report by saying he was "shocked but not surprised". He also said:
- Nationalists have an equal right to life. None of the security forces vindicated it. . . This represents a betrayal of the nationalist community.[citation needed]
The SDLP demanded to know how much former chief constables of the RUC knew about the collusion. During the time period under investigation Sir Hugh Annesley and Sir Ronnie Flanagan both filled senior management positions in the RUC including the office of chief constable. The SDLP also demanded to know how much then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Tom King and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher knew of the activities.
Nationalists continue to demand a full public sworn inquiry into the events with proven collusion like the Finucane murder, and all cases where collusion has been alleged. David Trimble, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, called for a parliamentary inquiry into the collusion.
It is notable that the new first Chief Constable of the PSNI, Hugh Orde, before his appointment, served at a senior level within the Stevens Inquiry team. He has insisted that the errors and the collusion within the RUC documented in the Stevens Report (the third issued by Sir John Stevens) will not be allowed to happen under the new police service.
[edit] Chief Officers
The chief officer of the Royal Irish Constabulary was its Inspector-General (the last of whom, Sir Thomas J. Smith served from 11 March 1920 until partition in 1922). Between 1922 and 1969 the position of Inspector-General of the RUC was held by five officers, the last being Sir Arthur Young, who was seconded for a year from the City of London Police to implement the Hunt Report and disarm the 'B' Specials. Under Young, who eschewed the RUC's military mindset in favour of a civilian approach similar to that held in the rest of the UK, the title was changed to Chief Constable. Young and six others held the job until the RUC was renamed. The final incumbent, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, became the first Chief Constable of the PSNI.
- Lt. Col. Sir Charles Wickham, from June 1922.
- Sir Richard Pim, from August 1945.
- Sir Albert Kennedy, from January 1961.
- J.A. Peacock, from February 1969.
- Sir Arthur Young, from November 1969.
- Sir Graham Shillington, from November 1970.
- Sir James Flanagan, from November 1973.
- Sir Kenneth Newman, from May 1976.
- Sir John Hermon, from January 1980.
- Sir Hugh Annesley, from June 1989.
- Sir Ronnie Flanagan, from October 1996.
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As part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
After the Partition of Ireland
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[edit] References
- ^ Overview and Recommendations document for Stevens 3 is available in PDF format here.
- ^ For a chronology of the Stevens Inquiries and surrounding events see BBC News 17 April 2003 available here.
- ^ Stevens 3 Overview and Recommendations document Page 3
- ^ Conclusions section of Stevens 3 Overview and Recommendations document Page 16
- ^ Stevens 3 Overview and Recommendations document Page 13
- ^ Conclusions section of Stevens 3 Overview and Recommendations document Page 16
[edit] Further Reading
Weitzer, Ronald, 1985. "Policing a Divided Society: Obstacles to Normalization in Northern Ireland," Social Problems, v.33 (October), pages 41-55.
Weitzer, Ronald, 1995. Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern Ireland (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
[edit] See also
- Police Service of Northern Ireland
- Royal Irish Constabulary
- Dublin Metropolitan Police
- An Garda Síochána
- the Stevens Report
- British Police
- UK topics
- Shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland
