Talk:Blue-water navy

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/Archive to 24 Oct 06

Contents 1 U.K 2 Definition 3 Falklands war reference 4 Russian Navy 5 Way ahead 6 Chanakya 7 Alternative approach 8 Useful content from British Maritime Doctrine Ed 3 Pub The Statonary Office, 2004 9 Sources about blue, green and brown water 10 Expansion of the navies with considerable blue water capabilities 11 Archive

[edit] U.K

The Royal Navy cannot be compared to the U.S Navy. The U.S Navy is the ultimate, the only truly blue water navy in the world. The U.K and French Navy's will be in the next category. Please correct it.

Chanakyathegreat 15:58, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

Agreed, but all three navies meet the basic blue-water criteria and a heck of a lot more. America is on a "different" blue-water level though, yes.UberCryxic 16:01, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

What I mentioned here is the following way the U.S and U.K is explained.

The US and UK navies, as the leading naval forces of the world, have a special position as blue water navies.[citation needed] The French Navy is also considered to have blue-water status.

Here, the U.S need to be seperated from U.K as the U.S is in a seperate club (a club of its own). U.K need to be clubbed with the French Navy like.

The US Navy, is the leading naval force of the world, have a special position as blue water navy. The U.K and French Navy are also considered to be blue-water navy's.

or something like this.

Chanakyathegreat 07:15, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

You have NO sourced defintion. So how do you want to make a classification? Furthermore the Rusian and Chinese concept of blue water abilities is totally neglected in your approach with a strict focus on the ability for massive global intervention. Wandalstouring 07:43, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Definition

In the absence of a credible definition on this and the two related articles the majority of the content is unreliable conjecture. I'll take a look in Defence Doctrine this week when I get a chance, but if no credible definition can be found then I'd question the justifiability of the article. WP:NOT and WP:V apply. ALR 20:57, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

There are reasonable definitions out there, which have been noted in this discussion page in various earlier discussions about what is and isn't a blue water navy. It is to our general discredit that we got embroiled in debates of which navy to list as such instead of actually writing up the definition itself. The article needs fixing, not deletion. Rhialto 22:00, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

Well sort the process. Agree a credible definition and cite it in the article. As it stands any discussion without a definition is pointless nationalistic posturing.ALR 06:12, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Sorry ALR, but those are some ludicrous assertions. The concept of a blue-water navy is firmly established in geostrategy and global politics. Wikipedia definitely needs to have an article on it. Per Rhialto, the problems have mostly centered on which modern navies qualify for that status. I'd be fine if we just talked about blue-water navies conceptually, offering some historical examples, while completely leaving out the debate on which nations do and which nations don't have blue-water navies.UberCryxic 22:35, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

I'm content that the blue-water and brown-water concepts are established concepts, although given that assertion it should be fairly straightforward of you to find credible definitions. The fact tag has been in place for 3 days and so far all that's been happening is pointless willy waving over Canada. So crack on and provide a credible definition.ALR 06:12, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

It is clear what a blue water navy is. all navies operating with ships several days travel offshore - traditionally. Now the US Navy invented the green water navy and I found no defintion of these terms any more. Some nations still define their navies traditonally, some have taken up the new defintion from US Navy. It is a mess. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051013.txt

"Question: I notice that you've added a color code to the Navy's mission area. You've added green to the traditional blue and brown. A definition of a couple of the terms you use in this thing -- expeditionary combat command; and globally networked force Maritime Component Commanders. These are terms that you have in your Guidance. Are they just different names for existing capabilities, or are they something new?

Admiral Mullen: We have the global network, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders is a concept that we have recently put in place to essentially link the component commanders from the United States Navy around the world. So they currently, in their old hats, their Navy hats, they're the fleet commanders. But really this takes them by designation, not that they weren't doing this, but this really designates them in the joint sense, and we will use them that way." Wandalstouring 23:04, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

Furthermore the US Navy defines that it needs brown, green and blue water abilities. - This way it is a definition of how far away from the shore a fleet is able to fight an enemy, not whether they are able to fight on foreign shores.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=6 "We are moving out in the green and brown water areas and because many operations are looking as an extension of what we talked about in the last few years in terms of the littoral, many operations are focused in the shallows. " (Remarks at the NDIA Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Panama City, Fla., 26 Oct. 2005)

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen060519-kqv.txt “CNO: We are looking at, in addition to the blue water ships which I would characterize and describe as our aircraft carriers and other ships that support that kind of capability, we're also looking to develop capability in what I call the green water and the brown water, and the brown water is really the rivers. I've engaged with heads of navies from around the world, upwards of 72 different countries, in the concept that I call a 1,000 ship navy. It's a thousand ships of like-minded nations working together to get at the emerging challenges of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, drugs, weapons, pirates, human trafficking and immigration. These are challenges we all have, and we need to work together to ensure that the sea lanes are secure.”

This article from the French wiki gives an overview about the ships of world's dominant navies etc. note: they decided to use a specific date. http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_militaire#Bâtiments_de_combat_des_ principales_marines_au_1er_janvier_2002

This is part of the German wiki article de:Deutsche Marine It describes that the German navy was treaty bound not to develop naval abilities to project power beyond a certain level offshore. Die Neuorientierung

...

Entsprechend ihrer Aufgabenstellung hatte das Operationsgebiet der Bundesmarine zunächst nur Nord- und Ostsee umfasst, wobei die Linie Dover-Calais im Westen und der 60. Breitenparallel im Norden die Grenze für Einsatzplanungen, jedoch nicht für Ausbildungsreisen bildeten. Diese nationale Einsatzbeschränkung wurde im Juni 1980 aufgehoben.

The area of operations vor the Bundesmarine contained at first only the North and Baltic Sea, while the line Dover-Calais in the West and the 60th latitude in the north were the borders of operational planning. -This way it was no blue water navy in accordance with the new defintion of blue, green and brown water navy.

Hauptwaffensysteme der Bundesmarine

Die Wiederbewaffnung Deutschlands erfolgte unter Auflagen, die in den Zusatzprotokollen zum Vertrag über die Westeuropäische Union (WEU) enthalten waren. Sie sahen als Beschränkungen für die deutsche Marine unter anderem eine Obergrenze der Standardverdrängung für Kriegsschiffe von 3.000 ts und für U-Boote von 350 ts vor. Die Auflagen wurden mehrfach zugunsten Deutschlands modifiziert und entfielen 1984 endgültig. Die letzten Schiffe, bei deren Entwurf die WEU-Beschränkungen noch zu beachten waren, waren die Fregatten der Bremen-Klasse, die zwischen 1982 und 1990 in Dienst gestellt wurden.

The restrictions for the German navy were established in the Western European Union additional protocolls. They have been changed several times and ended finally in 1984. The upper limit for warships it was 3,000 ts and for submarines 350 ts.

This way we have a navy that was treaty-bound not to be able to go beyond green water ability. The treaty can be taken as a guideline what is necessary for blue water ability. From this we can present the reader an overview about the blue water capabilities of different navies and their concepts (Russia would be ill advised with a large fleet of surface ships in the winter). Another point is the possibility of naval intervention support most editors use as blue water navy criteria right now. Wandalstouring 08:02, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

From British Maritime Doctrine, BR 1806, Third Edition, dated 2004:

• The operating areas of maritime forces range from the deep waters of the open oceans (known colloquially as blue water) to the more confined and often – although not invariably – shallower waters of littoral regions, estuaries and rivers (frequently, though misleadingly, referred to as brown water).

This is preceded by a fairly technical discussion related to:

• internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive

economic zones and on the continental shelves claimed by coastal states

• the rights of innocent passage, straits transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage

which results in the Littoral being a 300nm area, extending 100nm inland from shore and 200nm offshore to the extend of the exclusive economic zone.

Whilst there is no corresponding discussion of something as simplistic as blue water and brown water navies there is extensive discussion on the ability to exercise sea control at range with a combination of surface, sub-surface, airborne and space bassed assets.

That's all food for thought, althoughI'm starting to think that all three articles should be merged into something which can more usefully consider the military dimension of maritime operations.ALR 08:15, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

A navy can be a blue water navy or it will not be. There cannot be different one's like Major, Middile and Minor blue water navies. It's wrong concept, because the concept is like saying a candidate passed becaused his failure is by a small margin and he can be said to be minorly passed. It has been said again and again in former discussions that operating in blue water oceans cannot be considered as blue water navy. it is just a single criteria for a blue water navy. If you say that all navies that operate in blue water need to be termed as blue water navies then we will have somalian pirates in the list.

The potential section is for those navies that will become blue water navies in a short period of time. The German and some other navies need to be discussed (whether they are blue water/potential blue water) before adding them into the list (by looking into their expansion programme is substantial or not).

Chanakyathegreat 13:13, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Circular argument. you need a definition of the capability before you can identify which forces meet the categories. And nobody has provided a credible definition yet.ALR 13:28, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Somewhere it is provided. The only thing is it need to be integrated into one. It's not just Aircraft carrier's the whole discussion is on blue water navy and its capabilities. We discuss about a navy after it is added into the list. After the argument, the Navy is either into the Blue/Potential list or out of it. That's all. There is a way to rank the navy and place them in the list using the global security ranking, but nobody seem to be interested. Even that is so much complicated. Present method:If you want to add a navy just make a list. There will be argument and then there will be a decision.

Chanakyathegreat 13:57, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Somewhere it is provided

That's rather the point I'm making. If there is one, then it can be referenced. If there isn't then the article hass no place in Wikipedia, because it can't be verified.

fwiw the globalsecurity website can't be accessed from behind the firewalls here because its a popup trojan ridden nightmare, I'm also not convinced that it constitutes a reliable source anyway.

See my discussion below for what I've managed to find from the British Maritime Doctrine document.

tbh I think the way ahea is to come up with an aarticle which discusses gradations of employability.ALR 14:02, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I think you are referring to this part from the British Maritime report. The operating areas of maritime forces range from the deep waters of the open oceans (known colloquially as blue water) to the more confined and often – although not invariably – shallower waters of littoral regions, estuaries and rivers (frequently, though misleadingly, referred to as brown water).

This is operating in blue water, better say the capability of the Navy to operate in blue water. This cannot be confused with the Blue water Navy. The blue water navy is not just capable of operating in blue water, but much more than that. Else as I said, we have to rate even Somalian pirates, who can venture out into deep ocean as Blue water Navies. Chanakyathegreat 14:26, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

You've rather missed the point. British Maritime doctrine has no definition, it refers to the colloquialism. It then goes on to discuss what is involved in Blue Water operation, and Littoral operation. Which I haven't copied out in full. Once there is a credible, sourced definition of the requirement, then you can start fitting national assets into it. The key aspects are the ability to have organic force protection, and sustainable logistic reach. The snag is that be distilling the doctrine into an article I'm probably verging on Original Research.ALR 14:42, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

If Somalian pirates operate in blue water, they are operating in blue water. What is the difference to an aircraft carrier operating in blue water besides its size? Stupid question, but I see no reason to object if pirates get blue navy status. Wandalstouring 15:55, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Well that chapter of BMD is about 30 or so pages long, it goes into the principles of war in quite a lot of depth. It comes down to sustainable sea control at range; force protection, sustainable logistic reach, poise (as in the ability to present a credible threat for prolonged periods) etc all in someone elses Littoral area.

I suppose classically Blue Water would refer to the ability to conduct ASW in the North Atlantic for months at a time but given the expeditionary direction that current European policy is taking it's more related to crossing deep water to deliver effect somewhere else.

So in that sense we're talling about the ability to deliver massive force at reach, but also the ability to maintain a presence on station for extended periods, in terms of years. The UK have had at least two ships in the Persian Gulf for about 30 years.

Flat Tops are useful, when I was in Sierra Leone the value to Spearhead from having fast air available, even just to show that we had fast air, was significant. but doing drug busting in the Carribean needs rotary wing and multi-engine support. A flat top is of limited value for that.

ALR 17:26, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Yes, if Somalian or any pirates operating in blue water, they are operating in blue water. You must know the difference between a boat and an aircraft carrier. Also the pirates will get the Blue water status only after they have such aircraft carriers. I.E the capability to move in blue water is not the only criteria to have the Blue water Navy status.

Chanakyathegreat 16:32, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

So what is the criteria? Having huge ships with flying objects on them? Wandalstouring 16:34, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I wrote an email to the US Navy. They invented these conventions, so they can tell us what they mean. The discussion here is moving in circles. Next on my list is the Russian navy, the have a very submarine based theory, so perhaps they have a different definition of blue water. Wandalstouring 18:04, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Falklands war reference

That website I used as a cite is the homepage for a recognised writer of books on the topic of war. Would [1] be better as a cite? Can you explain why you removed the cite? Perhaps technically it is a personal site, but it appears to have reviews from several famous museums and other notables on the topic. Because if you can't, I'm washing my hands of this article. Rhialto 09:16, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Well for starters it doesn't actually support the statement you're citing it for. Argentine forces in the vicinity their own littoral were able to execute an operation in the absence of a credible OPFOR. Whilst the UK force at extended range were unable to establish air superiority, the did establish sea control (after they'd arrived). The point is valid, a littoral capable force can present a credible challenge to an expeditionary force at range, but the example isn't very useful and not applied rigorously. Can you provide the citation from the reference which you believe supports your argument? ALR 09:33, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

It does not support your statement, this does not mean it's content was not written by somebody knowing the topic. Besides, I moved it to external links, please keep some wikipedia standards. Wandalstouring 09:45, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Looks like I was right to take a break from this article. I'll just sit back and fix it once the edit war has died down. No need to stress myself out in an edit war. Rhialto 02:47, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Rather than sitting in the corner with the stated intent to return once a consensus has been achieved, can you provide a credible reference for the term which makes it anything more than a colloquialism? Also can you address some of the issues of OR which I've discussed, presumably you have a view? Can you also comment on the suggestion that all three articles be merged into something which sensibly discusses the issue of power projection.ALR 06:08, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Incidentally, both of us have responded to your question, but you've not bothered dealing with the issue we both raised, have you a position on whether the reference supports your argument?ALR 06:11, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Truth is, I feel like I pointed to the sun and said, "That is yellow." and then received, "No it isn't." in response. I read through that article, and it did appear to back up my point quite well. Perhaps that isn't as you perceive it. But I do know I don't have the heart to fight against what appears to me to be a flat contradiction. Rhialto 06:30, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

I read through both the page that you pointed to, and a couple of the others surrounding it, and don't believe that it's as conclusive as you suggest, without some effort on behalf of the reader. It would be useful if you could provide the citation from within the article which you believe supports your position.

Notwithstanding that, I'd actually disagree with your conclusion. Your argument appears to be that the force in the vicinity of their own littoral achieved dominance over the force at extended range. I don't see that as the case. Argentine forces achieved a level of full spectrum dominance in the early stages of the conflict, in part by throwing a disproportionate level of force at the sub-unit garrisoned at Stanley. They established waterspace dominance in the absence of any credible defending assets. Following the approach of the UKTG that dominance was quickly eroded. Although the Santa Fe is a useful example of the impact of defending ORBAT SMs in the battlespace.ALR 07:32, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Russian Navy

Try reading and understanding first.

The British Navy has 3 carriers and 16 nuclear submarines

The French Navy has 1 carrier and 10 nuclear submarines

as the discussion pointed out, these are the ships needed for blue water ability of a navy.

The Russian Navy has 1 carrier and 49 nuclear submarines on 1st January 2002

so even if only 20% of the Russian Navy are fit, it still equals the blue water ability of the French Navy. With 30% fit it equals roughly the UK. Very early in this discussion it was pointed out that Russia has a different blue water doctrine than the USA or the UK.

Further questions? Wandalstouring 13:05, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Way ahead

In the absence of a definition, the lists of navies which may or may not fulfil the, as yet undefined, criteria have no place.

/sandbox lists

They're at the subpage until a definition is agreed.ALR 13:54, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

As I have it in one quotation above, aircraft carriers were defined as blue water navy by US admiral Mullen. So all forces with aircraft carriers can be credited with a blue water ability.

I think the concept of defining different navies as blue water navies is a misconception of its meaning. US CON stated (see above) the US needed blue, green and brown water (and with brown I mean the rivers) ability, so the different types are defined by the area of operation. Usually a blue water navy has the ability to operate in green water and many green water units are able to enter blue water (but not all!). And so on small units suitable for close coastal defence (brown water) are often not suited for green water or even blue water. Admiral Nimitz and Potter discuss this decline of sea power the furter away from a friendly shore fleets are in their book "Sea Power". Wandalstouring 15:48, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I'm not so sure it's as simple as that, as stated elsewhere in the discussion, Spain has a flat top but they're not really capable of deploying a self contained task group, anytime the PDA deploys it's part of a NATO task group. Similarly whilst India has the former Hermes any recent activities have been in company with other nations, there is no evidence of actually deploying a sustainable TG. Elsewhere in BMD it does identify India and Japan as having credible middle tier navies, and China as being emergemtn, but they're not capable of sustainable, independent operation at range.ALR 15:56, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Do China's 5 nuclear submarines travel the Pacific and pose a potetial threat to the US with their nukes? (relying more on the Soviet blue water navy doctrine now) The problem here are verifiable quotations. As long as I'm the only one and that is all I found, we have to accept that. I didn't say I like it.Wandalstouring 16:01, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

This is where I'm concerned about bounding into OR territory, although it would almost certainly need to veer into the realms of classified material. For SSBNs to present a credible threat they need to have a considerable infrastructure to support them, and they need to be trained to an adequately high level. Force protection of SSBNs etc. I don't see China as having the capability to actually get their SSBNs close enough to the US without losing them, except in an undeclared pre-emptive strike. This is really where my concerns are about the definition, and I agree with you. What I've managed to dig up is the starting point for forming a theory of what is required, but I haven't found the outcome of the required work.

The other aspect is force protection, it depends on the threat. There is little point having a deck full of fast jets if the threat is FIAC loaded with HE, hence the Flat Top argument isn't particularly sound.ALR 17:14, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

:As I have it in one quotation above, aircraft carriers were defined as blue water navy by US admiral Mullen. So all forces with aircraft carriers can be credited with a blue water ability. This is another criteria to be a blue water navy as discussed for a long period. Another debate can be opened on this subject. But AC's have got tremendous capabilities, which cannot be neglected.

Similarly whilst India has the former Hermes any recent activities have been in company with other nations

Can you tell me which are these operations and with with other nation.

"Kindly take time to look at what's been happening. I moved your comments down the page so that they're in the current discussion about the definition, rather than one that's three months old. I've now responded to your point as well."

I did not notice that and I am sorry for that revert.

Well it looks like Chanakya has logged out and reverted again as IP:59.92.167.17 the edit summary uses a similar style.

Don't worry it was me. I had closed my browser. When I opened the page again and found it reverted. Hence reverted back again but the sign did not come up. Chanakyathegreat 16:41, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

In terms of the Ops, I can't remember the names but the IN has worked with the French, the British, the Dutch, Germans and the US. Indeed the last/ current deployment had a permanently attached French frigate.ALR 17:14, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

The IN has worked with many foreign navies. But your statement that recent activities have been in company with other nations

need to be provide with a source. Please provide the source. From what I know such activities have not happened except you are referring to exercises which is different from activities or operations that your statement mentions. Chanakyathegreat 03:14, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

No I don't, because I'm not proposing putting it into the article. I happen to know because my firm was involved in the work required to make it happen, there were a number of issues involved which had to be resolved.ALR 06:06, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Chanakya

Kindly take time to look at what's been happening. I moved your comments down the page so that they're in the current discussion about the definition, rather than one that's three months old. I've now responded to your point as well.

Also can you refrain from using deceptive edit summaries to undo the edits that I've made to the opening of the article. If you have issues wth the referenced material that I've added then feel free to bring it to the talk page.ALR 14:44, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Well it looks like Chanakya has logged out and reverted again as IP:59.92.167.17 the edit summary uses a similar style.ALR 14:56, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Alternative approach

Given the absence of any clear definitions for Blue, Brown or Green water how about an alternative way of dealing with the problem. The only authoritative stuff that I can find is British Maritime Doctrine, whcih talks about the subject but doesn't actually define it, emphasising more the characteristics, in very strategic terms, that one would expect to discern blue from brown. There is some commentary in there about India and Japan being emergent and China having an apparent intent to emerge as a blue water force. I'm not content that the citation I've given is adequate, to actually fit the article it needs some OR to build on it.

I'm also not convinced that three articles in isolation is all that useful, particularly given the nationalistic willy-waving.

As an alternative I'd propose merging all three into one article, titled Maritime Force Capabilities or something similar which would allow a more balanced discussion of the three, although I still haven't seen anything credible about Green being anything more than a recent invention. I think it would allow the whole subject to be covered more comprehensively and credibly, whilst being useful to the reader.

Thoughts?ALR 18:11, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I hope the US Navy or the Russian Navy respond me soon with a clear defintion of these terms. I would prefer to explain blue water ability, green water ability and brown water ability instead of making assessments on different fleets. After we explained what is needed for these abilities, we simply show a list what everybody has, so the reader himself can judge how much ability one nation has for the different kinds of operations. -> No POV issues as it is only quoting verifiable numbers. (Of course we can provide a note if a service is not fully fit for combat, like its numbers suggest.)Wandalstouring 18:36, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Why did you only ask the American and Russian navies? Seems like the British and the French would also be good candidates for this.UberCryxic 03:28, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Well on the UK side I've already provided a perspective, the term is a colloquialism. Also from BMD the RN sees itself as expeditionary capable, given the ability to project two task Groups and having a global SM capability. btw have you a view on the suggestion at the head of this section?ALR 06:04, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

The RN and the US Navy are the ones needing clarification. US Navy invented these terms we talk about and the status of Russian Navy is not clear. They didn't answer yet. Any suggestions towards the approach? I deleted the detailed reports on the different navies for we provide links to each of them and it is not yet clear what a blue water navy is and what it needs, so any discussion about who is and who isn't is pointless. Wandalstouring 09:27, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

British Maritime Doctrine is the RNs view of itself. hence why I've lifted chunks of it onto the talk page. The UK does not see the terminology as anything more than a colloquialism.ALR 09:34, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Useful content from British Maritime Doctrine Ed 3 Pub The Statonary Office, 2004

The Military Dimension The seas have had a military dimension to them for well over 2500 years. This is not changing and shows no sign of doing so, despite marginal attempts to demilitarise the oceans. There are over 150 navies world-wide, ranging from the one remaining superpower navy at one end of the spectrum, to tiny, heavily resource constrained coastal policing forces from the developing world and former Soviet states at the other. Between those two extremes there is a considerable variety of expertise and ability. Navies of medium capability continue to develop and increase in number, those of India and Japan being good examples of maritime forces being consolidated, while that of China, impressive though it is in numbers, has some way to go before it emerges as a powerful and competent force. It is important to realise that relatively minor maritime powers can pose threats of significance, especially in the context of lower intensity maritime operations. With the bulk of maritime military operations likely to be concentrated in the littorals, small, fast vessels armed with relatively unsophisticated surface to surface missiles can complicate sea control calculations. Once open hostilities break out, this type of threat can be dealt with reasonably effectively by a competent and well packaged maritime force; it is in those periods of rising tension, when states are flexing their muscles and the atmosphere is one of ambiguity and caution mixed with firm assertion of rights, that the presence of such vessels generates most concern. Add to them a conventional submarine threat and the maintenance of adequate sea control becomes considerably more complex.

Attributes of Maritime Forces Success in a major operation will usually require the joint integration of maritime, land, air and special forces. Individual military units need to cooperate and complement each other to achieve the common aim. Commanders of joint forces must recognise the distinctive attributes of each of the components, in order to play each to its strengths, especially important in the conduct of a manoeuvrist campaign. Maritime forces have distinctive operational attributes.

Access Over two-thirds of the world is covered by the sea and this allows maritime forces to exploit the oceans as a strategic medium for their relatively unhindered deployment to the most significant areas of interest and threat. Not only does this access allow intervention at a time and place of political choosing, but maritime forces may often be close to crises as they are developing. 85% of all states have a coastline and even many of those that are landlocked will be accessible from the sea with the co-operation of neighbouring coastal states.

Mobility Maritime forces can move hundreds of miles per day. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to potential adversaries. It also adds a critical dimension to all joint operations.

Versatility Warships can easily change their military posture, undertake several tasks concurrently and be available for rapid re-tasking. They can present a range of flexible and well-calibrated political signals. Furthermore, maritime command, control and information systems at the strategic, operational and tactical levels offer uniquely sensitive, flexible opportunities to co-ordinate maritime activity with diplomacy. The UK’s maritime forces routinely operate with other nations’ maritime forces, providing a flexibility of force packaging that transcends the limits of our own capabilities. There is, of course, a corollary to versatility in support of diplomacy.

Those states being signalled may misunderstand the level of threat being posed, and concurrent diplomatic activity may be required to resolve unintended ambiguity. The elements of versatility can be summarised as:

Flexibility in Response - Ships at high readiness are always manned and provisioned for hostilities and their systems and crews can respond rapidly to contingencies by progressing quickly from peacetime cruising, through enhanced readiness, to a more combative posture. This is important as periods of high intensity can occur in scenarios considered to be low intensity.

Adaptability in Roles - An individual warship of frigate size and above will have defensive and offensive capabilities in all dimensions (air, surface, subsurface and the electromagnetic spectrum). It can, therefore, operate in a variety of operational settings. Warships can be formed into task forces and task groups in which their individual characteristics combine to provide a mutually supportive, powerful and versatile combination of offensive and defensive capabilities. This, in turn, allows the group to operate at higher threat levels where conditions might be beyond the capability of a single ship.

Joint and Multinational Attributes - Maritime forces have traditionally taken part in operations involving other services and the crossing of environmental boundaries. By providing an amphibious capability for a multi-threat environment, the UK’s maritime forces regularly practise joint operations. Maritime forces are joint by definition, typified by balanced naval forces comprising air, land (in the form of amphibious elements) and integrated naval power under a composite command structure.

Joint Sea Basing can provide afloat headquarters, logistics, area surveillance and denial platforms and facilities for joint forces offering advantages in flexibility, sustainability and access. Indeed, forces delivered into theatre by sea as part of an amphibious task force are configured tactically and deployed ready for use; they are not merely transported. They are available for a joint task force commander to be afloat or ashore - depending on the nature of an operation. Their integral combat power can be decisive in the shaping and sustaining of most modern operations. British maritime forces comprise discrete units well practised in operating in multinational groups, either within NATO or in ad hoc coalitions. Inherent mobility allows maritime forces to assemble easily and the use of NATO and multinational doctrine and procedures allows multinational groups to co-operate and combine with the minimum of planning and preparation. Multinational maritime forces benefit from frequent periods in company to exercise and develop their full operational effectiveness.

Sustained Reach - Maritime forces have integral logistic support, including repair and medical facilities. The range and endurance that these provide give individual maritime units and task forces autonomy and sustained reach, which is the ability to operate for extended periods at considerable distance from shore support. Reach is enhanced by the provision of organic and consolidation tankers, supply and repair vessels. Only a maritime force so equipped can exploit the full potential of maritime power. If reach is to be sustained for an extended period, a roulement of replacement forces may be required. Seaborne logistic support provided by sea basing is an important element in sustaining forces employed in joint operations, particularly those engaged in manoeuvre warfare.

Resilience - Warships are designed to absorb substantial damage before they become non-operational. While a loss of capability through damage will degrade operational performance, a ship’s company is trained to restore systems to use as quickly as possible. Warships are also designed to operate within areas contaminated through the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with minimum degradation to their operational capability.

Lift Capacity - An important duty for maritime forces is protecting the unhindered passage of sealift. Sealift permits land and amphibious forces to transit and poise in theatre, and then enables joint power to be brought to bear ashore. Furthermore, it may often be the only practicable means of deploying mass (significant land and air forces, their battle winning equipment and logistic support) into a theatre of operations quickly and cheaply. For the UK, all major operations necessitate some maritime support to deploy, re-supply, withdraw, or re-deploy forces that have mass or have to deploy for extended periods (85% - 95% of lift in recent operations has been by sea). Although the Royal Fleet Auxiliary provides some sealift, a major operation relies for lift on chartered shipping, which may not necessarily be British registered or indeed readily available, and Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) Ro-Ros.

Poise - Once in theatre, maritime forces can remain on station for prolonged periods, either covertly or overtly. They can retain or seize the initiative or signal political resolve, and act as a force for deterrence or active coercion. The ability of maritime forces to poise in international waters allows the ‘footprint’ ashore to be optimised; that is to say the political complications and military risks of deploying forces and their logistic support for extended periods on land can be reduced. This unique capability to match the pace and reflect the tone of diplomatic activity is particularly useful in the dynamic and uncertain situations of the modern world. Poise exploits mobility, versatility, sustained reach, and lift capacity.

Leverage - Through suitable positioning and force packaging, maritime forces can provide leverage to exploit access and to influence events ashore disproportionately greater than the scale of force applied. Leverage is both a strategic and an operational concept, whose effects can be directly political or primarily military. Political leverage involves the coercion of governments which, in advance of hostilities, is an aspect of naval diplomacy. At the strategic level, a maritime nation or coalition can use maritime and other expeditionary forces to shape and exploit the battlespace and expose an enemy’s flank and rear. At the operational level, joint forces on a seaward front or flank can provide manoeuvre from the sea to attack, distract and fix much larger forces ashore, envelop or otherwise achieve the disruption of an enemy.

ALR 09:28, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Sources about blue, green and brown water

http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/ScienceDirect%20-%20Marine%20Policy%20%20Naval%20activity%20in%20the%20foreign.htm

Naval activity in the foreign EEZ—the role of terminology in law regime

Alexander S. SkaridovCorresponding Author Contact Information, E-mail The Corresponding Author

St. Petersburg Association of the Law of the Sea, 7 Kazanskaya St., St. Petersburg 191186, Russia

Available online 11 November 2004.

... However, the regime of the EEZ is not static. Many States are converting green water navies to blue water navies and this will increase military use of foreign EEZs, with possible repercussions for the EEZ regime. ...

http://www.usni.org/seminars/appliednh/06/appliednh06Mills.html "An Integrated Battle Space"

Brown-Water Challenges in Vietnam

Of course, when most people think “riverine warfare,” the first thing to come to mind is the Vietnam War, and the Vietnam experience thus got an entire panel session of its own, “Vietnam: How We Waged the Fight for Rivers and Canals.”

-defines brown water navy as fighting in rivers and channels

Wandalstouring 10:00, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

The snag is, in the first entry, there is only one mention of the term, and for all that its a paper about precise definitions in law, it doesn't define these :( Although I would infer from the wording that the use of Green is for Littoral operations within the EEZ, ie circa 200nm from shore. That which traditionally, and when I was at Staff College, has been described as Brown.ALR 10:03, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

read on it has several entires about brown water navy, I did not copy paste them here.

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/PRESS/REVIEW/1999/winter/imv-w99.htm ... The main premise of Commander Tim Sloth Joergensen, Royal Danish Navy, in his Spring 1998 article "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond" is that if one is going to take on a brown-water navy, then one is best served also to operate a brown-water navy. Commander Joergensen stated that "to be able to understand and counter a threat one should be able to pose the threat oneself."

...Wandalstouring 10:44, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

I've had another look at the first entry and not been able to find it, the second has many references to Brown as what I would describe as Riverine, the sort of thing that our RM Assault Groups engage in.

Reading the third mention it talks about Brown being more Littoral, which fits with my experience in use of the terminology. That also rather supports the point in the opening section about Expeditionary forces being threatened by Littoral Forces on their home turf, which is quite useful.ALR 10:21, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

the above article is about riverines, in this article only blue and brown appear, so it possibly uses the traditional definition without green. Wandalstouring 10:46, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Are you on about the St Petersburg paper, or the USNI proceedings? USNI is fine, the St Petersburg paper doesn't define.ALR 10:46, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

St Petersburg mentions the ability to project power into foreign waters, therefore I added it.Wandalstouring 10:49, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_57/ai_113755343 China's aircraft carrier ambitions: seeking truth from rumors Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2004 by Ian Storey, You Ji

Fits ambition to achieve "blue-water" (high seas) naval capability.

...

The first should be a "green-water active defense" that would enable the PLAN to protect China's territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The second phase would be to develop a blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific. Liu was able to put these ideas into practice during his tenure as commander in chief of the PLAN (1982-88) and then as vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (1989-97).

Liu believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to obtain aircraft carriers.

...

CHINA'S MARITIME DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Since the early 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, there was much talk of China's blue-water ambitions. Military analysts generally believed that by the year 2000 or shortly thereafter, the PLAN would have achieved green-water (i.e., coastal zone) status and would be capable of limited power projection into the western Pacific. By 2010 the transition to a blue-water navy would be complete. As of 2003, however, although the Chinese navy has increased its basic war readiness over the past decade, its overall progress is stagnant. It cannot even exercise sea control in its own coastal waters.

China's blue-water ambitions have remained unfulfilled for three reasons. First, despite impressive economic growth and industrialization since 1978, the PRC still lacks the financial resources and technological know-how to effect rapid and effective naval modernization. Second, as will be examined later, the Taiwan issue has forced the Chinese leadership to focus on home waters. Third, Soviet influence in terms of operational doctrine, campaign theory, and combat tactics persists, hindering the PLAN's transition to blue-water capability. (31)

In combat terms, the PLAN is restricted to offshore-water defense, mostly at the campaign level. In other words, although the Chinese naval strategy envisages, on paper, a global reach in the future, for the present it emphasizes the strategic or tactical deployment of naval power. This emphasis limits strategic objectives, weapons acquisition, and battle planning. More importantly, the PLAN's maritime strategy is reflected in the combat models that actually guide the navy's modernization.

According to China's maritime doctrine, there are two combat models: the first is the independent employment of naval power, and the second is that of joint operations with other services, particularly the army. (32) According to the first model, the navy's role is to project power into areas far from home waters, most likely in the form of strategic independent campaigns against the enemy's fleets or land targets. Under the second model, the PLAN's primary mission is defensive--to engage enemy ships in coastal waters--but the navy also has an offensive role, to assist the army and air force in amphibious operations. At present, the PLAN is limited in scope to missions of the second model, and has accordingly developed a light fleet. Ultimately, though, the goal is to fulfill the first model.

The projection of naval power far from coastal waters (i.e., the first model) is in fact a mission the PLAN already faces, though without the resources to accomplish it. (33) The most likely scenario would be armed conflict in the South China Sea, where the Chinese navy's mission would be to occupy disputed islands, ejecting the forces of other disputants. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is a unique case that cuts across the two models. Any action in the strait would be geographically close to home. However, the conflict zone could expand into deep oceans if the United States were to become involved militarily (as the majority of Chinese security analysts fully expect that it would). (34) In this case, the PLAN would have to engage enemy fleets relatively independently and in distant waters while it was assisting the army in amphibious landings on the island.

Sea control and sea denial are two important concepts that sustain the PLAN's combat models. Admiral Liu set attaining sea control as the service's most important priority soon after he became commander in chief. The PLAN proposes to exercise sea control within an inner line of defense that comprises China's three offshore narrows: the Bohai Sea Strait, the Taiwan Strait, and the Qiongzhou Strait. Of these the Bohai is the most important, as it protects Beijing and northern China. The Taiwan Strait is also vital, because it allows the PLAN access to the western Pacific. Aside from these three straits, the South China Sea is an area of major concern for the navy.

In exercising sea control, the PLAN would launch defensive campaigns against enemy fleets in waters adjacent to major coastal cities, such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Fuzhou. The Chinese navy would also try to obtain, by means of an offensive campaign--such as an amphibious landing on islands occupied by Taiwan, such as Jinmen--control of the sea around the invasion area and to protect the People's Liberation Army from the air and sea. As far as the PLAN is concerned, sea control is to be achieved not across a large horizontal geographic area but in a few vertically distributed lanes. It need not be comprehensive; partial control for a limited time would be sufficient.

... Wandalstouring 10:31, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Expansion of the navies with considerable blue water capabilities

The section considerable blue water capabilities need to be expanded. Else it need to be reverted to the old one.

Chanakyathegreat 06:43, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

Could you please tell in detail what you mean? I have found nowhere a classification of navies based on their planned abilities. Wandalstouring 06:50, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

I meant explanation of each navy and their capabilities. Chanakyathegreat 07:08, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

OK, I delet all navies without explanation. No problem. There existed no explanation and what each navy wants to buy sometime isn't relevant. Wandalstouring 07:34, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Archive

I've moved the majority of legacy discussion to the archive. That'll healp with both readability and applying some discipline to the discussion. I appreciate there had been recent additions to a number of sections but given the volume of change introduced in the last couple of days it would serve our purposes better to start as afresh as possible.ALR 09:27, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

Actually I'm done (and have little interest in the topic). I think the article defines now what a blue water navy is and avoids all the points where previous discussion started, turining it into an unreadable mess. While the outline is somehow given it surely can be refined. Wandalstouring 14:42, 25 October 2006 (UTC)

I like where the article currently stands. Good job to you guys.UberCryxic 16:21, 26 October 2006 (UTC)